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DIGITAL SAMPLING:
PUTTING THE PIECES
TOGETHER
INTRODUCTION
As technology advances, the level of difficulty of
copyright law questions increases., This difficulty is
seen in the area of sound recordings. As the new
technology of digital sampling becomes more preva-
lent in the music industry, questions concerning copy-
rights are beginning to arise. The most basic of these
questions is whether it is a violation of a sound
recording's copyright to "sample" a small portion of
the copyrighted work and use the sample in one's
own work.
Recently the first digital sampling case was decid-
ed. In Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Brotbers
Records, Inc., rap artist Biz Markie sampled from
Gilbert O'Sullivan's song Alone Again (Naturally).2
Markie used the main chorus (consisting of the three
words "alone again, naturally") of O'Sullivan's song as
an underlying theme of his rap song. Markie added a
drum machine and his own rapping to O'Sullivan's
chorus. Markie tried unsuccessfully to obtain a license
from O'Sullivan. Apparently, Alone Again (Naturally)
was O'Sullivan's one claim to fame and he was
unwilling to share his creation. Despite the lack of a
license, Markie included his version called Alone
Again on his album. The court held that Markie and
his record label violated O'Sullivan's copyright.
Since the defendants admitted that the Biz Markie
album contains the rap recording Alone Again, which
combines three words from O'Sullivan's Alone Again
(Naturally) with some of the music taken from the
O'Sullivan recording, the court reduced the issue to
ownership of the copyright to O'Sullivan's song and
master recording.'
There was irrefutable evidence that defendants
knew they had to obtain a license from O'Sullivan
and that when they could not obtain the license, they
decided to release the album anyway. Accordingly,
the court granted plaintiff's request for an injunction
to stop the sale of Markie's record. The court also
added that defendants' absolute disregard for the
rights of others warranted consideration of criminal
prosecution.4
Unfortunately, Grand pright raises more ques-
tions than it answers. Experts argue over the impact
of the case. What if the sample does not consist of
the main chorus? Also, what if a shorter sample is
used?' The Grand Upright ruling seems limited
because the sample from O'Sullivan's sound recording
was used throughout Markie's song.
This article will explore and attempt to answer the
unresolved questions left by the Grand Upright deci-
sion. It suggests a way to make the hard decisions
involved in digital sampling cases.
DIGITAL SAMPLING
AND COPYRIGHT DOCTRINE
One of the main purposes of copyright law is to
provide incentives for people to create new works.
The copyright laws give people the right to collect
rewards for their creative contributions. 6 These
rewards are intended to motivate creative activity and
to allow public access to the final results of the cre-
ativity.' In order to encourage musicians to share their
creative expression with the public, copyright's
rewards and protections are a necessity.
Section 102 of the Copyright Act specifically
grants copyright protection to sound recordings." In
the digital sampling context, this protection is prob-
lematic. In order to fully benefit from copyright pro-
tection, the plaintiff in the digital sampling context
must not only be able to protect her entire sound
recording but also its component parts. Otherwise,
the incentive to create new sound recordings will be
reduced.
In order for authors of sound recordings to
receive copyright protection against unauthorized
sampling of their sound recordings, they must satisfy
the requirements set forth in the Copyright Act. The
Copyright Act protects original works of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium of expression.9
Accordingly, the Act creates an originality require-
ment; however, originality determinations are not
based on a high standard."' The standard is minimal."
Novelty or uniqueness is not required. The only
requirement is that the work's origin is with the
author and the work be independently created. 2
Originality requires only the expression needed to
distinguish authorship," and creativity need only be
minimal." Even if the work is seen as crude, humble
or obvious, almost any labor will be sufficient to satis-
fy the originality requirement." The amount of effort
is not part of the analysis."
A plaintiff must show that the sample taken by
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the defendant resulted from some creative work.17 In
Smith v. George E. Mueblebach Brewing Companyi
the plaintiff was unable to show that his musical com-
position satisfied the originality requirement. Plaintiffs
musical composition consisted of the words "Tic Toc,
Tic Toc, Time for Muehlebach" scored to two musical
notes." The court found this musical composition too
simple to be given protection. It did not meet the low
level of originality required because it lacked the min-
imal level of creativity-it was a copy of material in
the public domain, a clock ticking, and could be
reproduced mechanically by a clock.20 This same
analysis prevented plaintiff in Shapiro, Beistein and
Co., Inc. v. Miracle Record Co. Inc," from obtaining
copyright protection in his bass line. The court stated
that the bass line was too simple, consisting of only
basic musical chords.-
In a more recent case, a plaintiff was able to
show the required originality in his musical composi-
tion. In Levine v. McDonald's Corp.,2 the court decid-
ed that a nine measure musical composition (consist-
ing of a note played 128 consecutive times then a
note one step higher played eight times and then
back to the first note played eight times) did warrant
copyright protection, despite its simple repetitive
technique.
In digital sampling, the plaintiff must show the
requisite amount of originality in the sample, as
opposed to the entire sound recording, to qualify for
copyright protection.'
Originality arguments may focus on the sample's
creativity, either from a quantitative or qualitative
approach. If the inquiry focuses on quantity, one or
two notes could have the creativity necessary while
four or five bars may not. If the inquiry focuses on
quality, a sample taken from the chorus of the origi-
nal sound recording may warrant greater protection
than a sample taken from other parts of the record-
ing. A qualitative analysis may also consider other
aspects of composition. For example, notes played on
a piano may qualify for a different level of copyright
protection than notes played on a synthesized instru-
ment. Arguably, the naked note on a piano requires
less creative input by the artist than a highly comput-
erized note on a electronic keyboard because the
keyboardist has more choices as to how that note will
sound.
Once plaintiff has proved that the sample does
meet the standard of creativity (originality) necessary
to receive copyright protection, he must show that
defendant's sampling was not an "independent fixa-
tion." According to section 114 of the Copyright Act,
"the exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a
sound recording... do not extend to the making...of
sound recordings that consist entirely of an indepen-
dent fixation of other sounds."2' Defendant digital
sampler will argue that digital sampling is within her
right to make an independent fixation of sounds that
imitate plaintiffs original work. However, if plaintiff
can show sampling does not involve independent fix-
ation, then he can make an infringement claim.
Defendant's argument that sampling does consti-
tute an independent fixation relies on the fact that the
sampler is able to alter the sounds once in the com-
puter. The original sound and the sampled sound are
different because of the manipulation of the original
sound. Sounds are added and subtracted through the
sampling process and this changes the components of
the original."2 Accordingly, this manipulation makes
the sampled sound not merely a reproduction of the
original but an independent fixation. 7
However, plaintiff will rebut that this argument is
flawed because it overlooks the word "independent"
in the statute. How can sampling be considered inde-
pendent when by its nature it involves using another's
work as a stepping stone? Digital samples that are
rearranged or altered in some way still do not consist
entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds.
The plaintiffs original sounds are still part of the sam-
ple used by the defendant. Defendant's manipulations
and alterations of the sample may be independent
work, but defendant did not start with an indepen-
dently created expression. Independent fixation does
not result from or begin with copying another's origi-
nal sounds.
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Once a musician plaintiff shows that his sounds
are protected and what the sampling defendant took
is not an independent fixation according to section
114, the plaintiff must prove copyright infringement
has taken place. Plaintiff must show that taking small
pieces of a sound recording constitutes infringement
according to the copyright law.
Every circuit uses a copyright infringement test,
and even though all tests vary, the applications have
basic similarities. First, all variations require plaintiff
to show ownership of a valid copyright. Second, all of
these tests require proof of copying by direct and/or
indirect evidence. Third, these tests use a substantial
similarity analysis to compare the original work to the
alleged infringing work. The following specific tests
are illustrative of the variety that exists.
The court in Arnstein v. Porter articulates the tra-
ditional approach to copyright infringement analysis.
There are two separate elements plaintiff must prove.
First plaintiff must prove that the defendant copied,
and second that the copying constituted unlawful
appropriation.
Under Arnstein, the first element can be proved
by direct evidence (defendant's admission of copying)
or indirect evidence (access to plaintiffs work and
similarity between the works). If no direct evidence is
available, evidence of access allows the inference of
copying to be made.
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There are several ways in which to prove access.
Plaintiff can show that defendant had access to a
computer with digital sampling capabilities and had
the knowledge to operate such a computer. Plaintiff
could also show that defendant samples other works
as a common way of producing her own sound
recordings. All this evidence will show that sampling
(copying) must have occurred.
Sufficient similarity between the two works, in
addition to access, must also be present to prove
defendant copied. Experts' analysis of the two works
are used to help the trier of fact determine if the two
works are sufficiently similar. If no proof of access is
available then the similarities must be 'striking" in
order to find copying.2'
If copying is shown by plaintiff, then the second
element of the Arnstein test must be proved. The trier
of fact decides if the copying is substantial enough to
constitute unlawful appropriation. Unlawful appropri-
ation is based on the ordinary lay observer; no expert
testimony is used. The trier of fact alone decides if
the copying resulted in the two works being substan-
tially similar."
The Ninth Circuit has added extrinsic and intrinsic
tests to the Arstein substantial similarity analysis."
The extrinsic test separates the ideas from the expres-
sion in plaintiffs and defendant's work to determine if
the ideas are substantially similar. The intrinsic test
allows the ordinary observer's response to determine
if the expression of the ideas in both works is sub-
stantially similar. The ordinary observer decides if the
total look and feel of the works are substantially simi-
lar . 2
More recently in the Ninth Circuit, these tests
have been delineated as an objective and subjective
examination of the two works as a whole without
separating their ideas from their expression." The
intrinsic test no longer contains analysis, but is merely
a subjective judgment about the similarity of the two
works."
The Northern District of Illinois states the analysis
slightly differently." First, plaintiff must prove that he
owns a valid copyright. Second, he must prove that
illicit copying exists. To prove the illicit copying,
plaintiff must establish copying and unlawful appro-
priation. To prove copying plaintiff must show access
and substantial similarity. Substantial similarity
involves comparing the two works. Finally, to prove
unlawful appropriation plaintiff must show that defen-
dant copied protectable expression."
In all courts, plaintiff must often prove access and
substantial similarity to infer copying because direct
evidence of copying is not usually available.'7 The dif-
ficulty is that substantial similarity is a nebulous con-
cept without an exact meaning. 8
To better define substantial similarity, some courts
use a quantitative/qualitative analysis. This method is
used most often when only a small fragment of the
two works is identical.Y Even though the similarity
between the two works can be quantitatively small,
substantial similarity can still be found if the material
is qualitatively important to either work. 0 This analy-
sis allows copyright laws to protect the expression of
ideas and not merely ideas alone.41
Assuming that plaintiff could show that his sam-
ple contained the required amount of creativity to be
protected by copyright and that he could also show
that defendant's use of the sample was not an inde-
pendent fixation, plaintiff must now show that
infringement occurred. Under traditional copyright
law he must show substantial similarity. However,
using traditional substantial similarity in the digital
sampling context is problematic for several reasons.
As discussed before, under section 114, imitation
of a sound recording is not an infringement.
Therefore if a sound recording is substantially similar
to an original sound recording no infringement exists,
unless the actual sounds were used. If a plaintiff
shows that his sound recordings substantially similar
to defendant's work, the most he has shown is that
defendant imitated his sound recording but did not
unlawfully copy. In digital sampling, the similarity of
expression is obvious and intended." Therefore, the
ultimate determination is at what point does appropri-
ation become infringement of the author's rights. In
its present form, the substantial similarity test does
not answer this question. To say that infringement in
digital sampling cases occurs when the trier of fact
finds substantial similarity between the two works is
to ignore the problem digital sampling presents.
Another problem arises under the substantial simi-
larity test as to what portion of the two works are to
be compared. Since sampling only involves taking a
small number of sounds, defendant's work with plain-
tiffs sample probably does not sound anything like
plaintiffs entire sound recording. Therefore, if plain-
tiffs sound recording as a whole is compared to
defendant's work as a whole, the two works in a sam-
pling case will not likely be found substantially similar.
However, if comparing sample to sample, the
final outcome is different. If the sample defendant
took is identical to the sounds in plaintiffs sound
recording that correspond to the sample, substantial
similarity will always be found because the sounds
are one and the same. However, if defendant has
altered the sounds sampled from plaintiffs recording,
then substantial similarity will not automatically be
found.
Similarly, when the issue of substantial similarity
in digital sampling cases is reduced to how much the
sampler actually took problems arise. Almost all com-
mentators dislike this test for digital sampling cases.'
The problem with looking only at the quantity taken
is that what is taken becomes secondary to the analy-
sis. The assumption is that six bars 4' six notes1 or
whatever quantity is chosen is substantial enough and
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is automatically an infringement. In other words, if
the sample is not of the designated length, it cannot
be unique enough to be protected. 7 This analysis
ignores the fact that six notes of sound recording "A"
could be unique and creative but that six notes of
sound recording "B", the same quantitative amount,
could have no uniqueness at all. Under the quantita-
tive analysis both A and B receive the same protec-
tion. Copyright protection should not be confined to
encompass only the sounds that meet the prerequisite
length. The quantity of sound defendants took should
not be the primary focus.
Another problem with the quantitative approach
is that digital samplers are given an easy safety net. If
an arbitrary line is drawn, all a sampler has to do is
avoid crossing the line to defend against any infringe-
ment suit.' Even if sampling is limited to one sound,
the accuracy of the computer allows the sampler to
take one half of a sound. 9
The qualitative approach better defines when sub-
stantial similarity occurs. The qualitative test looks not
to the length of the sample but to the sample in rela-
tionship to the rest of the original sound recording.
"In other words, although the amount taken may be
small, it may be the unique portion that gives the
song quality."0 The qualitative approach sees the
whole song damaged when a unique portion is
taken. 1 An infringing use can be found even if a short
sample of a sound recording is taken, if by comparing
the two works it is clear that the sample is recogniz-
able and important to the source.?
This qualitative test is by far the most favored by
commentators." The following is illustrative of the full
analysis. The musician who samples has one purpose.
This purpose is to capture a sound and from that
sound create her own music. The sampler wants to
capture the unique quality of an isolated sound. After
the sound is captured, the sampler musician can alter
and modify the sound as if she created it herself.
Accordingly, the focus of the inquiry should be
whether the sound sampled and reproduced is a
qualitatively substantial portion of the original work.4
The problem with the qualitative approach is that
the focus is away from the sample and is instead on
the entire, original sound recording. Arguably, this is
an improper focus since defendant took only the sam-
ple; the entirety of the original sound recording
should be irrelevant. In other words, using the quali-
tative approach, the sample is valued according to its
importance relative to the entire sound recording, but
the entire sound recording is not the issue here-only
the sample is."
Having infringement turn on the importance of
the sample to the entire sound recording poses anoth-
er problem in sampling cases. The sampler is after a
distinctive sound that is found in plaintiffs sound
recording. If the sounds that defendant samples are
qualitatively important to the original work, plaintiff
can prove infringement. If the sample is not impor-
tant, plaintiff fails to show infringement." Plaintiff will
argue that although not all sounds are qualitatively
important to the original work, the entire work should
be protected from sampling. Accordingly, the sampler
who takes a sample from a less prominent part of the
sound recording should not be less of an infringer
than the sampler who takes sounds from the melody.
Both did the same deed, but the qualitative test treats
them differently.
A NEW APPROACH
Because of the problems involved in applying tra-
ditional substantial similarity notions to the digital
sampling context, a new approach recommended.
Under the new test, the court must decide whether
the sample alone is a creative work of authorship
worthy of copyright protection. The court's analysis
should be as follows. First, identify and separate out
the portion that is in both sound recordings. Then
decide whether the sample alone is a creative work of
authorship. Both sides will argue why the sampled
sounds should or should not be considered protected
expression using the traditional copyright standards
for originality.
If plaintiff proves originality of the sampled
sounds, and therefore copyright protection of those
sounds, then the next step is to show that defendant's
use was infringing. Instead of using a substantial simi-
larity analysis to decide this issue the court should
adopt a new standard specifically for digital sampling
cases.
Digital sampling is unique in that the computer
can perfectly separate out individual sounds. By mak-
ing each individual sound essentially a separate work
from the whole sound recording, the individual
sounds can survive without or apart from their
source. For example, one or two words of a book or
one or two brush stokes from a painting cannot stand
on their own. They both need a context in which to
have meaning. But the fact that samplers take small
pieces from sound recordings must mean that some-
how the piece (sample) is valuable in and of itself
without the context of the rest of the sound record-
ing. Because of this unique aspect of digital sampling,
any test that is formulated for infringement must
absolutely focus on only the sample, not the entire
original sound recording.
With this in mind, the substantial similarity test
should drop out of the infringement analysis in digital
sampling cases, and with it, the qualitative and quan-
titative analysis. In its place, a "significant originality"
test is proposed. Under this test, the sample itself
would be analyzed under the originality inquiry.
However, the originality requirement for samples
would be increased from the minimal level to a high-
er level. In other words, this "significant originality"
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test would require a heightened showing of creativity
in order to find whether infringement of an original
sample has occurred.
Accordingly, in order to receive copyright protec-
tion against infringement for the sampled parts of an
original sound recording, the plaintiff must make two
showings. The first showing of originality will qualify
the sample for copyright protection under section
102. The second showing will prove that the sample
contains "significant" originality in order to protect it
against unauthorized sampling. A plaintiff must show
that the sample taken by defendant embodies more
creativity and originality than what the copyright
statute requires for initial protection under section
102. Any unauthorized sampling of a piece that satis-
fies the "significant" originality standard will be con-
sidered an infringement.
Under this analysis, the more creative the sample
the more protection it receives from digital sampling.
The focus of this test is away from comparing the
substantial similarity of the two works and instead
looks to the amount of creativity in the sample. The
amount of creativity dictates when infringement
occurs and the amount of protection from digital sam-
pling a given sample may receive.
In summary, for plaintiff to prove copyright
infringement of an original sample, several steps must
be taken. First, plaintiff must show that the sample is
original and deserves protection. Second, plaintiff
must successfully argue that digital sampling does not
involve independent fixation of sounds. Third, plain-
tiff should argue that the traditional substantial simi-
larity test for infringement is not appropriate in the
sampling context. If the court is willing to accept the
proposed test for infringement in digital sampling
cases, plaintiff will then argue the "significant original-
ity" standard to prove the requisite amount of creativi-
ty embodied in the sample. If plaintiff can accomplish
these steps, a finding of copyright infringement
should result.
FAIR USE
Defendant may assert the fair use defense against
a claim of infringement. 7 The fair use defense allows,
as an exception to copyright protection, copying and
distribution in limited and useful forms.8
The Copyright Act names four factors to be used
when considering fair use." These factors are used on
a case-by-case analysis." The factors include: (a) the
purpose of the use; (b) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (c) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used; and (d) the effect on the potential market.61
Using the four factors in the statute, digital sampling
plaintiffs can successfully argue against defendant's
assertion of fair use.
A. The Purpose of the Use
To rebut the defense, plaintiff will argue that the
facts applied to the four factors for inquiry set forth in
the statute preclude a finding of fair use. The first fac-
tor looks to the purpose of the use. This requires
looking at the commercial or non-profit character of
the use. If the purpose was primarily for private com-
mercial gain as opposed to public benefit, the pre-
sumption will be against fair use.A
The difficulty with this first factor is that commer-
cial gain is not defendant's sole purpose. Digital sam-
pling is a form of creative expression.6 The purpose
of digital sampling is not merely to sell records, but is
also a way to express ideas. However, the Court in
Harper and Row, Publisher, Inc. v. Nation Enterprses
held that the distinction between commercial and
non-commercial is based on whether or not the user
will profit without paying the customary price for the
use of the copyrighted work. This de-emphasizes the
sampler's artistic motive from the analysis and instead
focuses on the benefit the sampler receives.
A digital sampler profits from the use in many
ways. First, sampling gives the sampler desired
sounds without the expense of independently pro-
ducing the sounds. As a result the production costs
are reduced. However, this savings in production has
an ultimate effect on musicians, whose services
become in less demand. Second, many musicians see
sampling as simply another profit-making aspect of
the business. 65 Kris Parker, from the popular rap
group Boogie Down Productions, sees the issue as
"about money and money and more money."" The
economics of sampling cannot be ignored.
The first fair use factor also involves looking to
the productivity of the use.67 A productive use is one
in which the material is used in a different manner or
for a different purpose than the original. In Metro-
Golduyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Co-Op. Prod., the
court had to decide if a musical version of Gone with
the Wind served the same overall function as the
novel and movie." The court found that both works
served to entertain. The musical version was not criti-
cism, comment, reporting or teaching but rather for
the same purpose as the original-pure entertain-
ment.6 As a result, the court rejected the fair use
defense.
This case is analogous to the digital sampling situ-
ation. If the focus remains on the purpose of each
work, fair use will likely not be found in digital sam-
pling cases. The purpose of the original sound
recording is to entertain a listening audience. The
purpose of the sound recording that contains the digi-
tal sample is also to entertain. Accordingly, the pur-
poses of the works are the same, and the defendant
has not shown productive use.
Fal, 1992 5
Itahara: Digital Sampling: Putting the Pieces Together
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
B. The Nature of
the Copyrighted Work
The second fair use factor is the nature of the
copyrighted work. This includes three different analy-
ses. First is whether the work is published or not?0
With respect to unpublished works, the scope of fair
use is much narrower.
71
In the typical sampling case this factor will favor
defendant. Most samplers use sound recordings that
have been released to the public and have had a pre-
vious musical life. The samplers want to use the pop-
ularity of the older sound recording to their advan-
tage in the promotion of their new sound recording.
However, if a plaintiff can show that her sound
recording was an unpublished work this factor would
then favor plaintiff.
The second analysis looks to whether the copy-
righted work is factual. Fair use has a greater applica-
tion to factual works than non-factual works?2 A
sound recording is easily categorized as a nonfactual
work. The original author, in her sound recording, is
expressing her interpretation of the musical composi-
tion. The result is a purely creative work. Accordingly,
this factor will likely favor plaintiffs.
In matters of public concern, the reason for look-
ing to whether or not the work is factual or not is that
the public has a greater right to factual information.7
As applied to digital sampling cases, it is unlikely that
public need to access plaintiffs sound recording is so
great as to take precedence over the plaintiffs exclu-
sive rights in the work.
A third analysis used to determine the nature of
the copyrighted work is whether or not the copyright-
ed work resulted from a large investment of time and
labor with the expected final outcome of financial
reward.? Most sound recordings are a result of many
hours in the music studio perfecting the quality of
sound. If plaintiff can show a significant investment of
time involved in producing the sound recording, this
factor disfavors a finding of fair use.
C. The Amount and Substantiality
of the Portion Used
The third fair use factor looks to the "amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole."' This factor is ana-
lyzed with both a quantitative and qualitative evalua-
tion. In other words, fair use will not be found even
though only a small amount was taken if this consti-
tutes the essential part of the copyrighted work.
Plaintiffs argument becomes easier if the sampler
took the chorus or the "catchiest" part of the sound
recording. Courts have not found fair use when the
portion copied was "essentially the heart of the copy-
righted work."' Plaintiff need only show that what
defendant sampled was the most important or the
most valuable part of the sound recording in order to
rebut the fair use defense.?
Under a quantitative analysis of the amount of
work copied, the defendant will argue that the num-
ber of sounds sampled in relation to the entire sound
recording is insubstantial. The plaintiff could rely on
the Harper and Row decision to rebut this. In the
Harper case the words from the copyrighted work
that were actually copied were a small part of the
entire book as a whole. However, the Harper court
then made a qualitative judgment as well by stressing
that the copying involved was word for word.?
"The fact that a substantial portion of the infring-
ing work was copied verbatim is evidence of the
qualitative value of the copied material, both to the
original (artist) and to the plagiarist..."" With this in
mind, the plaintiff can argue that the portion, despite
its small amount, is of value because the actual sounds
are copied in the sampling process "word for word."
D. The Effect of the Use
on the Potential Market
The fourth fair use factor examines the effect of
the use upon the potential market or value of the
copyrighted work. This factor has been described by
the Supreme Court as the most important element of
fair use.81 A proper analysis of fair use would only
apply to copying that does not materially disadvan-
tage the market of the work that was copied.u The
statute looks to the potential market of the copyright-
ed work. Potential market is defined as the immediate
or delayed market and includes harm to derivative
works.15 The fourth fair use factor implies that the
original author has the right to exploit all potential
markets for the original sound recording.
A court will consider whether the defendant's
sound recording diminishes the potential sale of
plaintiffs sound recording." Most often the original
sound recording sampled and the new sound record-
ing containing the sample are not popular at the same
time. Accordingly, this type of analysis will probably
cut against plaintiff, especially when the sampler's
sound recording actually renews interest in the older
sound recording."
Potential harm to the plaintiffs market is also mit-
igated if the potential customers for each work are
different sets of people. If this is the case, less compe-
tition results and the use is more likely to be fair. For
example, when a rap artist samples from a country
and western song, the two audiences are completely
separate. In this way, if the customer wants the plain-
tiffs original sound recording, defendant's sound
recording does not fulfill that customer's demand.
However, plaintiffs will rebut that potential customers
include all people who buy records. Therefore, any
other sound recording that contains plaintiffs sounds
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will compete with the sale of plaintiffs sound record-
ing.
The Court in Harper and Row took a slightly dif-
ferent approach. It said that "to negate fair use one
need only show that if the challenged use should
become widespread, it would adversely affect the
potential market for the copyrighted work."" With this
analysis, plaintiff has a much better chance of show-
ing harm to a potential market. If the use of the sam-
pled portion of plaintiffs song was widespread, the
song may become so common that no one will find
the original song appealing thus resulting in plaintiffs
lost sales.m
E. Non-Statutory Fair Use Factors
Another factor which artists like the one in Grand
Upright can rely on in fair use analysis is the good
faith or bad faith of the sampler. If the plaintiff can
show that defendant knew a clearance was necessary
but did not obtain one before using the sample, then
defendant acted in bad faith. If plaintiff can show that
defendant acted without regard for plaintiffs rights in
her sound recording, the court may be disinclined to
allow defendant to hide behind the fair use doctrine.
If a defendant can show that he thought there was a
certain amount of sampling that is automatically toler-
ated and he did not exceed that amount, the court
may lend a sympathetic ear. However, considering
the level of copyright controversy surrounding sam-
pling in the music industry, this argument is unlikely
to succeed.
From a policy perspective, the purpose of copy-
right law is to reward the artist for his contributions,
which in turn will stimulate artistic creativity for the
public's benefitY In fair use, a balance must be struck
between the benefit to the public if the use is permit-
ted and personal reward to the artist if the use is
denied.' * This balance is not always easy to make
because, by limiting the right to add on to an earlier
work, creative expression is inhibited.9" If sampling is
permitted, creativity will be increased but the ultimate
effect of this may be to reduce the incentive for artists
to create the original works that could be sampled.
Digital sampling seems far from the intent behind
fair use guidelines. The statute gives examples of
"criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, schol-
arship or research."' These examples imply that fair
use requires that the copying have an almost academ-
ic or informative purpose. Digital sampling-the
copying of actual sounds from an original sound
recording for use in one's own sound recording-
does not seem to fit within these suggested categories
of fair use. Digital sampling is merely repetition of the
copyrighted work.
CONCLUSION
The Grand Upright case is currently unique in
that the plaintiff was unwilling to allow sampling of
his work even though compensation was offered.
However, if digital sampling continues to increase,
the number of plaintiffs who would rather protect
their sound recording rather than receive royalties for
its use is likely to increase. As a result, the record
companies will lose their control over this aspect of
the industry and settlements will become less fre-
quent. Less settlements will result in more trials to
decide when copyright infringement occurs.
Not every case that arises in the sampling context
will be as clear as Grand pright. Courts will eventu-
ally have to deal with the general issues of originality
of the sample; whether or not the process of sampling
constitutes independent fixation; and how the sub-
stantial similarity test applies in digital sampling cases.
Courts will also have to decide when a finding of fair
use is appropriate.
These issues are not easily answered in the digital
sampling context. If it is true that copyright law has
the ability to adapt to changes in technology,"5 then
digital sampling will be the cause of its newest meta-
morphosis. However, clarity in the digital sampling
area will not result until these copyright issues are
identified and addressed.
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